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Chapter 7
Taking the Subsidy Out of Early
Retirement: Converting to
Hybrid Pensions
Robert L. Clark and Sylvester J. Schieber
The fraction of the U.S. labor force covered by an employer-provided pen-
sion plan has remained stable during the past three decades. However, the
outlines of the pension universe have been transformed significantly. Since
the passage of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) in
∞Ωπ∂, there has been a strong and ongoing trend away from the use of
defined benefit plans as more and more firms have chosen to offer defined
contribution plans, especially ∂≠∞(k) plans (PBGC ∞ΩΩΩ). This movement
toward greater utilization of defined contribution pensions has occurred
primarily among smaller employers.∞
In the past decade, another significant development has emerged, with
the conversion of traditional final-pay defined benefit plans to cash balance
and pension equity plans. This recent change is occurring mainly among
larger employers, although a number of smaller employers have also made
the shift. Among larger employers, the adoption of hybrid plans has been
particularly prevalent in the financial services, utilities, and telecommunica-
tions industries. Among smaller or intermediate sized employers, the adop-
tion of these new plans has often occurred in the health services industry.
Each of these industrial sectors has undergone some restructuring in recent
years, and hybrid plans may be a response to the dynamic business environ-
ment in which employers have found themselves.
The ongoing growth of defined contribution plans has been the focus of
research studies for over a decade, as analysts have attempted to explain
the reasons for the shift and its impact on workers and firms (Clark and
McDermed ∞ΩΩ≠; Gustman and Steinmeier ∞ΩΩ≤; Ippolito ∞ΩΩπ). By con-
trast, the conversion of traditional defined benefit plans to hybrid plans has
only recently become the focus of scholarly research (Brown et al. ≤≠≠≠;
Clark and Munzenmaier, ≤≠≠≠). The void in research has to some extent
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been filled by reporting in the popular press that has relied extensively on
selected interviews with senior workers in large companies who have been
adversely affected by the adoption of hybrid plans. The present analysis
extends the debate by offering new evidence on the impact of plan conver-
sions on workers who stay with their employers under hybrid plans. We
examine the full extent of the conversion process including changes in
supplementary defined contribution plans and the use of transition bene-
fits to moderate the effect of the conversion on senior workers.
Three results from the shift to hybrid pension plan have been identified
by Brown et al. (≤≠≠≠). First, they showed that the shift to hybrid pensions
would benefit the vast majority of affected workers, if they were to quit their
jobs under the new plans prior to the early retirement eligibility age. Sec-
ond, they found that the conversion to the hybrid plans generally meant the
elimination of early retirement subsidies characterizing the prior plan de-
signs. Third, they demonstrated that the majority of benefit reductions that
would occur in the shift to hybrid plans would be concentrated among
portions of the covered populations that remained with their employers
beyond retirement age eligibility. This prior study did not document the
extent to which the elimination of early retirement subsidies was the reason
for benefit reductions occurring in the shift to hybrid plans. The present
analysis focuses on the elimination of these early retirement subsidies in the
shift to hybrid plans, to measure whether this explains the benefit reduc-
tions that sometimes occur during plan redesign.
Our assessment of plan conversions is divided into three parts. We begin
with a description of a unique sample of ππ plan sponsors that converted a
traditional defined benefit plan to a hybrid plan after ∞Ω∫∑. We evaluate
whether the replacement of the traditional pension with a hybrid plan in-
creased or decreased company retirement costs, whether changes were
made in related retirement benefits, and whether transition benefits were
provided to some or all existing workers at the time of the conversion. We
then assess the characteristics of workers who can expect to have increased
retirement benefits after the plan conversion and the characteristics of
those workers who expect to be adversely affected by the change. Next, we
disentangle the impact of plan conversions per se on retirement income,
from changes that would have occurred if the traditional plan had been
maintained but all early retirement incentives were eliminated. Finally, we
close by placing our results in the context of evolving retirement policy and
practice. Our conclusions support previous findings that younger workers
with limited job experience gain disproportionately from plan conversions,
because traditional pensions tend to benefit disproportionately workers to-
ward the end of their careers. Younger workers are less likely to remain with
their current employer until retirement, and so will typically get little bene-
fit from traditional plans. Hybrid plans, on the other hand, usually provide
larger benefit accruals to younger workers than the plans they replace.
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Senior workers with considerable job tenure at the time of the conversion
often receive lower benefit accruals under the new hybrid plans than they
would have under their prior plans unless special transition rules are ap-
plied. We also conclude that most of the reduction in benefits for workers
adversely affected by the shift to a hybrid plan is due to the elimination of
subsidized early retirement benefits, not to the plan conversion itself.
Understanding Conversions to Cash Balance Plans
The effect of converting traditional defined benefit plans into cash balance
or pension equity plans is examined using a sample of ππ employers who
converted their pension plan between ∞Ω∫∑ and ≤≠≠≠. The sponsors of all of
these plans are clients of Watson Wyatt Worldwide, a major benefits consult-
ing firm, and the sample is composed of all the plans for which Brown et al.
(≤≠≠≠) were able to access sufficient plan information to compute retire-
ment benefits under the prior traditional plan and the new hybrid plan.≤
Among the plan conversions considered are ∂∏ employers who established
cash balance plans and ≥∞ firms that adopted pension equity plans. The
number of active participants in these plans ranges from ∞≠≠ to over ∞≠≠,≠≠≠.
The distribution of plans by number of active participants is shown in Table
∞. Although the sample includes plan conversions during a ∞∑-year period,
most of the changes have occurred since ∞ΩΩπ; ≥∞ of the plan conversions
were made between ∞Ω∫∑ and ∞ΩΩ∏, and ∂∏ conversions were made between
∞ΩΩπ and ≤≠≠≠.
Benefits in the prior traditional DB plans were determined using an aver-
age earnings formula, with ∫π percent of the plans employing some mea-
sure of final average earnings, and ∞≥ percent using a career average for-
mula. Among the final average plans, π≠ percent based benefits on the final
five years of earnings. Only ∞∏ percent of these plans were not integrated
with social security, with half of the sample using an excess integration
formula and one-third using a benefit offset method. This sample of tradi-
tional plans that were converted to hybrid plans tended to have a higher
percentage of plans using final average salary in the benefit formula and a
higher percentage of firms integrated with social security than was true
more generally.≥ The preretirement earnings replacement rate for workers
hired at age ≥≠, who remained in these plans until age ∏∑, ranged between
≤∑ and ∑≠ percent for ∫∫ percent of the plans in the sample. All but two of
the prior plans included subsidized early retirement benefits.
After the conversion process, new formulas in both the cash balance and
the pension equity plans provided specified credits to a benefit account for
each worker. Less than half of the new cash balance plans (≤≠ out of ∂∏)
provided for a uniform percentage of base pay to be credited to an em-
ployee’s account, varying from ≤ to ∞≠ percent of pay each year. Slightly over
half of the plans (≤∏) varied the amount credited by age and/or years of
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Table 1. Distribution of Sample Plans by Size and Type of Plan
Number of Active
Plan Participants
Cash Balance
Plans
Pension
Equity Plans
Total
Plans
∞≠≠–∂ΩΩ ∂ ≥ π
∑≠≠–ΩΩΩ ∞≠ ≥ ∞≥
∞,≠≠≠–≤,∂ΩΩ ∏ ∞≠ ∞∏
≤,∑≠≠–∂,ΩΩΩ ∞≠ ∏ ∞∏
∑,≠≠≠–Ω,ΩΩΩ ∫ ∞ Ω
∞≠,≠≠≠–∞Ω,ΩΩΩ ≥ ∏ Ω
≤≠,≠≠≠ and over ∑ ≤ π
Total ∂∏ ≥∞ ππ
Source: Authors’ calculations; see text.
service. Thirteen of the plans increase the pension credit for earnings above
a designated level that is a percentage of the social security wage base. Most
of the plans credit an annual return on the account balance equal to the
rate on some specified Treasury bill or bond ranging from three month to
≥≠-year bonds, while seven plans specified some other rate or tied the an-
nual return to the consumer price index. Among the ≥∞ pension equity
plans, ∂ specified a fixed percentage of earnings to be credited annually to
each individual’s account ranging from π to ∞≤ percent; ≤π plans had dif-
ferential annual credits to participants’ accounts that varied by age and or
years of service. In ∞∫ plans, individuals received a higher pension credit
above a designated level of earnings which was a specified percentage of the
social security wage base or average social security covered compensation.
Benefit formulas in the traditional final pay DB plans produced a sharp
increase in the value of retirement benefits with continued service at older
ages. Subsidized early retirement provisions in those plans provided a sharp
increase in present value of pension benefits once the worker had reached
the age of early retirement. Together these characteristics of the traditional
defined benefit plans provided greater benefits to long service workers who
remained with the company until the age of eligibility for early retirement.
Pension equity plans and cash balance plans more closely approximate ca-
reer average defined benefit plans without early retirement options than do
defined contribution plans. These plans provide for a more uniform in-
crease in benefits with continued employment and do not have the signifi-
cant spike in pension benefits that is embedded in final average pay plans
with early retirement provisions.
Elimination of Early Retirement Subsidies
Economists have been studying the retirement incentives embedded in our
retirement systems for over two decades (Quinn ∞Ωππ; Burkhauser ∞ΩπΩ;
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Gordon and Blinder ∞Ω∫≠; Fields and Mitchell, ∞Ω∫∂; and Kotlikoff and
Wise, ∞Ω∫∑). One plan feature that has garnered substantial attention is the
pattern of accruing benefits for workers who work beyond the normal retire-
ment age in these plans (typically age ∏∑). Often failure to retire and begin
to take benefits by this age results in a negative accrual of benefits for
additional years of work, primarily because plans may limit the number of
years of covered service allowed and because there are no adjustments in
the actuarial value of accrued benefits beyond normal retirement age.∂ Fail-
ure to take a benefit in this situation simply results in the ultimate monthly
or annual annuity being paid over a shorter period of time, thus reducing
the total lifetime benefit paid. This provides an economic incentive for
workers to retire at the normal retirement age, and most empirical studies
report a spike in the probability of retirement at this age.
A second plan feature that received considerable attention is the effect of
early retirement subsidies on work and retirement decisions. To clarify how
these subsidies affect lifetime benefits, consider the accrual pattern of bene-
fits shown in Figure ∞ for a worker hired at age ≥≠ at a starting salary of
$∂≠,≠≠≠ per year who is participating in one of the benefit plans in our
sample. For example, the solid line in the figure shows that the present value
of pension benefits for this worker grows in value from zero at the point of
hire, to the equivalent of roughly one and a half years of annual pay at age
∑∂.∑ By working from age ∑∂ to ∑∑, the value of the benefit for this worker
suddenly jumps from one and a half times pay to slightly more than three
times pay. This occurs because the plan provides an immediate benefit at
age ∑∑ with less than a full actuarial reduction relative to the benefit that
would be provided at normal retirement. If the worker does not continue to
work under the plan until reaching age ∑∑, he or she would not qualify for
this special subsidy and would receive benefits under the regular benefit
formula.
The dashed line in Figure ∞, which shows the pattern of accrued benefits
that would be provided if early retirement were not subsidized, may be
compared to the subsidy curve. The value of the subsidy is roughly one and a
half years of pay at ∑∑; it holds relatively steady until age ∑Ω, and then it
declines steadily beyond that. At the normal retirement age of ∏∑, the sub-
sidy has been completely exhausted. The existence of the subsidy at age ∑∑
provides a significant step up in pension wealth and thus increases the
incentive to retire. The gradual ‘‘wearing away’’ of the subsidy acts as a
significant disincentive to continued employment for workers subject to this
benefit formula. In this case, it acts as a discount of one-third of a worker’s
pay for work between age ∏≤ and ∏≥ or ∏≥ and ∏∂, and as much as ∂≠ percent
of pay for work between age ∏∂ and ∏∑. This pattern evidently provides a
significant economic incentive to retire after a worker has satisfied the re-
quirements for early retirement, and it generates a substantial increase in
the probability of retirement at the early retirement age. Thus, traditional
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Figure ∞. Value of accrued pension benefit (present value) as a multiple of annual
pay: new hire at age ≥≠ with a starting pay of $∂≠,≠≠≠. Source: Authors’ calculations
from data provided by Watson Wyatt Worldwide.
defined benefit plans encourage early retirement of workers many of whom
are probably still in the productive portions of their working lives.
Table ≤ arrays the plans in our sample according to the rate at which their
early retirement subsidies wear away, computed as a percentage of pay by
age of retiree. In this case, we are looking at a worker with ≤∑ years of service
at age ∑∑. We assumed this worker’s starting salary was $∂≠,≠≠≠ per year in
current terms and that it would grow over time at the rate of average wages
in the economy. Between age ∑∑ and ∏≠, ≥∫ percent of plans reduced the
value of workers’ earnings by ≠ to ≤≠ percent per year through the erosion in
the value of the early retirement subsidies. Between age ∏≠ and ∏≤, more
plans reduce the value of early retirement and the size of the annual wear
away is increased. Nearly three-quarters of the plans reduced their early
retirement subsidies for workers in this age range. Between the age of ∏≤
and ∏∑, Ω∏ percent of the plans reduced their early retirement subsidies and
≥Ω percent did so at a rate that reduced the economic value of the wage
earned for added years worked by at least ≤∑ percent. One plan offset the
wage earned by ∑≠ percent per year from age ∏≤ to ∏∑. Some of these plans
had very significant penalties for continued employment of workers with
substantial service.
Figure ≤ shows how the accrual pattern under the pension plan repre-
sented in Figure ∞ changed when the traditional DB plan was converted to a
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Table 2. Percent of Plans with Alternative Annual Wear Away Rates of Early
Retirement Subsidies
Wearaway Rate
as % of Annual Earnings
(Percent of Plans)
∑∑–∏≠ ∏≠–∏≤ ∏≤–∏∑
≠.≠–∂.Ω% ∞∂.≥ ∞≥.≠ Ω.∞
∑.≠–Ω.Ω ∏.∑ π.∫ ∞∫.≤
∞≠.≠–∞∂.Ω ∞∑.∏ ∞∑.∏ π.∫
∞∑.≠–∞Ω.Ω ∞.≥ ≥≤.∑ ∞∞.π
≤≠.≠–≤∂.Ω ≠.≠ ∞.≥ ∞≠.∂
≤∑.≠–≤Ω.Ω ≠.≠ ∞.≥ π.∫
≥≠.≠–≥∂.Ω ≠.≠ ≠.≠ Ω.∞
≥∑.≠–≥Ω.Ω ≠.≠ ≠.≠ ∞∂.≥
∂≠.≠–∑≠.≠ ≠.≠ ∞.≥ π.∫
Source: Authors’ calculations (see text), assuming worker has ≤∑ years of service at age ∑∑, start-
ing salary of $∂≠,≠≠≠, and average nominal wage growth.
cash balance plan. The solid line in the figure shows the accrual pattern
under the old plan, and the dashed line shows the accrual pattern under the
new cash balance plan that replaced it. This particular worker would clearly
be better off under the new plan if he or she terminated employment prior
to age ∑∑, since the early retirement subsidy in the old plan was eliminated
in the shift to the new plan. Even at the normal retirement age of ∏∑ the new
plan’s benefits are not as generous as the old plan’s. Nevertheless, continued
employment beyond the normal retirement age will ultimately make the
new plan more valuable.
Very different incentives apply to workers who terminate their employ-
ment prior to immediate pension eligibility, as is evident from Figure ≤. The
hybrid plan provides a stronger incentive for workers to stay with their
employer at earlier ages, while it also imposes less penalty if they leave prior
to reaching early retirement eligibility. Very different incentives also apply
for continued employment beyond both the early retirement age, and the
normal retirement age for long-career workers. The new plan does not
subsidize early retirement, nor does it penalize continued work.
A significant element of the story behind the shift from traditional de-
fined benefit plans to a hybrid plan type is the elimination of early retire-
ment subsidies that had existed in the former. Of the ππ cases under study
here, π∑ had early retirement subsidies in their traditional plans. We have
estimated the magnitude of these subsidies by estimating what share of plan
costs was attributable to the subsidies paid for early retirement benefits. In
developing these cost estimates, we employ the projected unit credit cost
method that the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) requires
private plan sponsors to use in developing accounting measures of their
plans’ expenses and liabilities.∏
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Figure ≤. Value of accrued pension benefit (present value) as a multiple of annual
pay: new hire at age ≥≠ with a starting pay of $∂≠,≠≠≠ under a traditional and a hybrid
pension plan. Source: Authors’ calculations from data provided by Watson Wyatt
Worldwide.
For purposes of comparison the cost analyses are based on a simulated
workforce that we created and then applied to all firms, rather than on the
characteristics of each individual firm’s labor force.π We generated a syn-
thetic workforce of ∞≠,≠≠≠ workers randomly selected from a combined
pool of roughly ∞∏∑,≠≠≠ workers, taken from over a dozen of Watson Wyatt’s
larger clients. For each of the workers, we had information on date of birth,
date of hire, and pay level. We used turnover assumptions consistent with
those that would generally prevail in large firms offering a defined bene-
fit plan. We did not employ plan-specific turnover experience, although
higher turnover rates are applied to the health and hospital plans consistent
with observed behaviors.∫
For the plans under study, the distribution of early retirement subsidies as
a percentage of total plan costs is shown in Figure ≥. The plans are ranked
by the estimated total cost of the original plan. Early retirement subsidies
tended to be somewhat larger, on average, in plans with higher costs than in
those with lower costs. For example, among the ≤≠ plans with the lowest
costs, the average share of the total costs attributable to the early retirement
subsidies was ∞≠ percent of the total plan costs, whereas among the highest
cost ≤≠ plans, the early retirement subsidy accounted for ∞Ω percent of total
plan cost. However, some of the low cost plans had early retirement sub-
Taking the Subsidy Out of Early Retirement 157
Fi
gu
re
 ≥
. R
an
ki
ng
 o
f p
ro
je
ct
ed
 u
ni
t p
en
si
on
 c
os
ts
 a
tt
ri
bu
ta
bl
e 
to
 e
ar
ly
 re
tir
em
en
t s
ub
si
di
es
. S
ou
rc
e:
 A
ut
ho
rs
’
ca
lc
ul
at
io
ns
.
158 Robert L. Clark and Sylvester J. Schieber
sidies as large as plans at the upper end of the cost distribution, and some of
the highest cost plans had relatively minimal early retirement subsidies. To
link back to the earlier discussion, the cost of the early retirement subsidies
in the original pension plan described in Figures ∞ and ≤ was about ∞Ω
percent of the total plan costs in that case. Within our sample, that plan was
among the more generous in subsidizing early retirement, but it was defi-
nitely not the most generous.
As the above discussion suggests, the elimination of early retirement sub-
sidies offers a pension sponsor the opportunity to reduce the cost of the
retirement plan without making any other changes. Technically, an em-
ployer can eliminate the early retirement subsidies in its pension plan with
certain limited grandfather provisions. For example, assume that a plan
with significant early retirement subsidies for a worker at age ∑∑ with ≥≠
years of service was amended on July ∞, ≤≠≠≠ to require full actuarial reduc-
tions for retirements prior to the plan normal retirement age of ∏∑. This full
actuarial reduction could be implemented immediately, upon adoption of
the amendment, for anyone who terminated employment after July ∞, ≤≠≠≠,
who had not reached age ∑∑ lacked and lacked ≥≠ years of service. For a
participant had reached age ∑∑ and completed ≥≠ years of service prior to
July ∞, ≤≠≠≠, the benefit could not be reduced below the earned accrued
benefit if the worker retired immediately before the plan amendment took
effect.
If the participant in this case had not met the early retirement subsidy
criterion prior to the effective date of the amendment, but subsequently did
meet it, then the amount of the subsidy earned under the prior formula
would be preserved. In this case, the worker’s benefit would be the larger of
the benefit earned up to the point of transition, including the early retire-
ment subsidy, or the benefit under the plan as modified at the date of
retirement. Thus, the worker’s accrued benefit would not be reduced by
the amendment, but he or she would not accrue additional benefits until
subsequent service and pay raises led to an accrued benefit under the new
formula that exceeded the grandfathered benefit under the old formula.
Because this worker’s accrued benefits already reflect the value of the early
retirement subsidies, elimination of early retirement subsidies from the
plan would not result in any significant employer cost savings. Virtually all
the potential cost savings from eliminating early retirement subsidies re-
flected in Figure ≥ would therefore drive from the elimination of subsidies
for workers not yet eligible for early retirement at the point of transition.
The grandfather requirements for early retirement subsidies result in a
‘‘wearaway’’ situation for plan sponsors who eliminate such plan subsidies.
This phenomenon has created a significant amount of adverse publicity in
the conversion to hybrid plans, because some workers receiving a grand-
fathered portion of the early retirement subsidy in prior plans could go for
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several years without earning added benefits under the new plan. But as
Table ≤ and the discussion around it shows, there is a significant amount of
wearaway already built into traditional defined benefit plans with early retire-
ment subsidies. It is quite likely that some workers who believe they were ad-
versely affected by the wearaway phenomenon in the transition to a hybrid
plan are actually not suffering wearaway as rapidly under their new plan as
they would have under their original one, had they stayed under it. Also, in
the case reflected there, workers covered under the plan who terminate em-
ployment prior to age ∑∑ would typically be better off under the new plan
than the old one.
It is clear from Figure ≤ that some of the cost savings resulting from
the reduction in benefits to people reaching early retirement age are re-
distributed to workers who leave prior to that age. What is not clear is
whether the added benefits provided to shorter term workers would be
more or less costly than the benefit reductions resulting for people who
would have attained early retirement age under the old plan. In this particu-
lar case, we estimate that the plan sponsor realized some added costs over
and above reinvesting the early retirement subsidies back into the plan in
the shift from a traditional plan to a hybrid plan. Of course the standardized
workforce and turnover assumptions used in estimating these cost changes
may not reflect the actual cost changes realized by any particular employer.
In earlier work, Brown et al. (≤≠≠≠) reported that on average the projected
unit credit service cost reduction in the shift from traditional hybrid plans
was around ∞≠ percent of the original plans’ costs. When modifications to
the ∂≠∞(k) plans by these same sponsors were factored in, they estimated
that the average service cost reduction employers realized in shifting to
their new retirement plans dropped to around one percent.
Next we take a different look at plan cost changes by considering them
against the base plans after eliminating their early retirement subsidies. The
purpose of this exercise is to see if employers were reducing plan costs
beyond the elimination of early retirement subsidies, or whether this was
the extent of savings they were realizing and whether they actually put the
early retirement subsidy reductions back into the plan. Considering the net
change in plan costs due to eliminating early retirement subsidies, we find
that ∂∫ percent of the plan sponsors put at least the full value of the savings
into their combined defined benefit and defined contribution package.
Another ∞∂ percent put some of the value realized back into the plan. Some
≥∑ percent of plans reduced costs somewhat more than what they would
have realized by simply eliminating early retirement subsidies, though, as
reflected in Figure ≥, many plans had relatively small early retirement sub-
sidies. Nearly one-fifth of those sponsors that kept some portion of the
savings realized from eliminating early retirement subsidies had total reduc-
tions in plan costs of ∑ percent or less.
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Cumulative Benefit Changes in the Shift to Hybrid Plans
One reason that the shift to hybrid plans has been so controversial is that
some redistribution of benefits among plan participants accompanies the
conversions. Even a plan conversion that increased pension costs may make
some workers worse off under the hybrid plan than they would have been
under the prior traditional plan. One way to show the effects of the transi-
tion is to calculate benefits for prototypical workers to show how their bene-
fits compare under the old and new environments.
Comparative pension benefits for three hypothetical workers in the plans
under analysis appear in Table ≥. The first worker, in the top panel, is hired
at age ≥≠ with an annual salary of $∂≠,≠≠≠ per year in ∞ΩΩΩ. The second
worker, represented in the middle panel of the table, is ∂≠ years of age and
∞≠ years into his career by ∞ΩΩΩ, earning a salary of $∑≠,≠≠≠ per year. The
third worker is assumed to be age ∑≠ and ≤≠ years into a career by ∞ΩΩΩ,
earning $∏≠,≠≠≠ per year. Higher or lower salaries will change the numbers
slightly, but not enough to change the pattern of accruals in the alternative
types of plans.Ω
A number of the plans analyzed here were converted from a traditional
defined benefit structure to a hybrid plan structure several years ago, with
one as long as ∞∑ years ago. Some of the earliest hybrid plans have been
modified since they were first adopted, and we did not have all the detail on
the time path of these modifications. For purposes of these comparisons, we
have estimated the benefits for our hypothetical workers under the defined
benefit plan in operation at the time of the initial shift to a hybrid plan, and
then we compare the initial benefit to the benefit provided by the current
hybrid plan.∞≠ This means that when we consider the implications of the
shift to a hybrid plan adopted ∞≠ years ago for a worker who is ∂≠ years of age
with ∞≠ years of service in ∞ΩΩΩ, we are comparing the accruals of a worker
who has already been covered for ∞≠ years under the new plan with one
covered under the prior plan for that whole period. This has particular
implications for older workers who might have been covered under transi-
tion provisions in the shift to a hybrid plan. Often plan sponsors will adopt
transition provisions that may cover workers who will reach retirement eligi-
bility in the first five to ten years after the transition to the new plan. For the
oldest hybrid plans, the transition provisions are likely to have expired for
the older, longer service workers we are considering here. Our choice of
calculating comparison benefits in this case would result in smaller benefits
under the hybrid transition arrangements than actually were provided for
older workers in most cases. In that regard, our estimates of benefit reduc-
tions in the shift to hybrid plans for older workers are upper bounds of the
likely effects on plan participants at the time of the conversions.
The row labels in Table ≥ reflect the ratio of benefits from the hybrid plan
relative to benefits that would have been provided to the same worker under
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Table 3. Accumulated Benefit Provided by Hybrid Pension Plan Relative to Prior
Plan Benefit (% of Plans)
Ratio of Hybrid Plan to
Hybrid Plan Benefit Age ∂≠ Age ∑≠ Age ∑∑ Age ∏≠ Age ∏≤ Age ∏∑
New hire at age ≥≠, beginning pay of $∂≠,≠≠≠ in ∞ΩΩΩ
[∑≠ ≠.≠ ∞.≥ π.∫ π.∫
∑≠–ΩΩ ≥.Ω ∞≠.∂ ∑≠.π ∏∞.≠
∞≠≠–∞∂Ω ∑.≤ ≥∞.≤ ≤∫.∏ ≤∂.π
∞∑≠–∞ΩΩ ∞≥.≠ ≤∏.≠ ∏.∑ ≤.∏
≤≠≠–≤∂Ω ∞Ω.∑ ∞∫.≤ ≥.Ω ≤.∏
≤∑≠–≤ΩΩ ≤∏.≠ ∑.≤ ∞.≥ ≠.≠
≥≠≠–≥∂Ω ∞≠.∂ ≤.∏ ≠.≠ ≠.≠
≥∑≠–≥ΩΩ ∞≠.∂ ≥.Ω ≠.≠ ≠.≠
∂≠≠+ ∞∞.π ∞.≥ ∞.≥ ∞.≥
Worker at age ∂≠ with ∞≠ years service, pay of $∑≠,≠≠≠ in ∞ΩΩΩ
[∑≠ ∞.≥ ∑.≤ Ω.∞ ∞≠.∂
∑≠–ΩΩ ∞∞.π ∑∫.∂ ∏≤.≥ ∑π.∞
∞≠≠–∞∂Ω ∂≠.≥ ≤Ω.Ω ≤≥.∂ ≤π.≥
∞∑≠–∞ΩΩ ≤∫.∏ ≥.Ω ≥.Ω ≥.Ω
≤≠≠+ ∞∫.≤ ≤.∏ ∞.≥ ∞.≥
Worker at age ∑≠ with ≤≠ years service, pay of $∏≠,≠≠≠ in ∞ΩΩΩ
[≠.∑≠ ∞.≥ ∑.≤ ∞≥.≠ Ω.∞
≠∑≠–≠ΩΩ Ω.∞ ∂∂.≤ ∑≠.π ∑≠.π
∞≠≠–∞∂Ω ∑∑.∫ ∂∫.∞ ≥∑.∞ ≥Ω.≠
∞∑≠–∞ΩΩ ∞Ω.∑ ∞.≥ ∞.≥ ≠.≠
≤≠≠+ ∞∂.≥ ∞.≥ ≠.≠ ∞.≥
Source: Authors’ calculations; see text.
the prior pension plan. For example, consider the row labeled ∞∑≠–∞ΩΩ for
the worker hired at age ≥≠ in the top panel of the table. It indicates that ∞≥
percent of the hybrid plans would provide this worker a benefit at age ∂≠
that was ∞∑≠ to ∞ΩΩ percent of the benefit that would have been provided by
the prior plan. The next line shows that ∞Ω.∑ percent of the hybrid plans
would provide a benefit at age ∂≠ that was ≤≠≠ to ≤∂Ω percent of the benefit
that would have been provided by the prior plan. The evidence indicates
overall that the shift to hybrid plans increased benefits for workers who
terminate employment at younger ages. Nearly Ω≠ percent of the hybrid
plans provide higher benefits for workers leaving prior to age ∑∑ than did
the prior plan. Beyond age ∑∑, however, most of the new plans provide
smaller benefits than the prior plans would have. It is these benefit reduc-
tions for long-career workers reaching the prevalent retirement eligibility
ages under traditional pension plans that has created some negative pub-
licity about the shift to hybrid plans.
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Table 4. Future Pension Accruals as a Percentage of Pay for Workers Shifted into a
Hybrid Plan with the Same Cost as the Prior Plan, by Age and Service at
Date of Shift
Tenure at Time
of Conversion
(years)
Age at Time of Conversion to a Hybrid Plan
≤≠–≤Ω.Ω ≥≠–≥Ω.Ω ∂≠–∂Ω.Ω ∑≠–∑∂.Ω ∑≠–∑Ω.Ω ∏≠–∏∑
Future pension accrual rate as % of pay for those winning or held harmless
≠–∂.Ω ∞.Ω∫ ≥.≤∏ ∂.∫≠ ∏.∂≤ ∏.∂≥ ∏.∏≠
∑–Ω.Ω ≤.∞π ≥.≤∂ ∂.π∑ ∏.∞Ω π.≠≤ π.∂∞
∞≠–∞∂.Ω ≤.∑π ≥.≥π ∂.∑≤ ∑.∫∞ ∏.π≠ π.π∂
∞∑–∞Ω.Ω ≥.∂Ω ∂.∑∞ ∏.∞∏ ∏.∂∫ π.π∑
≤≠–≤∂.Ω ∂.∞≥ ∂.∏≤ ∏.≠∞ ∏.Ω∫ π.≥≤
≤∑–≤Ω.Ω ∂.Ω∑ ∏.≤∏ ∑.π∫ π.∏∞
≥≠+ ∑.∑∞ ∑.∫∂ ∏.≤Ω ∏.∑∑
Future pension accrual rate as % of pay for losers
≠–∂.Ω ∂.≤π ∑.≥∞ ∏.≥≠ π.π∏ ∫.≥∏ Ω.≠∞
∑–Ω.Ω ∂.∫≠ ∑.≤Ω ∏.≤∑ π.π∞ ∫.∂≥ Ω.≠∫
∞≠–∞∂.Ω ∑.≥≥ ∏.≤∑ π.π∞ ∫.∂π Ω.∞≥
∞∑–∞Ω.Ω ∑.∂≠ ∏.≤∂ π.∑Ω ∫.∑≠ Ω.∞∂
≤≠–≤∂.Ω ∑.≥Ω ∏.≥≠ π.∏≠ ∫.∑≥ Ω.∞≥
≤∑–≤Ω.Ω ∏.∏∫ π.∏≤ ∫.∑≥ Ω.∞∂
≥≠+ π.∞≤ π.∏Ω ∫.∑∂ Ω.∞≥
Source: Brown et al. (≤≠≠≠).
We acknowledge that the impact of plan conversions is more complex
than simply one of cutting retirement benefits. Brown et al, (≤≠≠≠) simu-
lated a ‘‘synthetic’’ workforce of ≥≠,≠≠≠ workers through the remainder of
their careers with three employers who had shifted from a traditional pen-
sion to a hybrid plan. These workers were randomly drawn from the same
workforces of ∞∑ of Watson Wyatt’s larger actuarial clients, as described
earlier. By simulating these workers through the remainder of their careers,
the authors compared estimated benefits under the prior and replacement
plans. They conclude that replacing a traditional plan with an essentially
equivalent projected unit credit cost left about ∫≠ percent of workers at least
as well off under the new plan, and many would be better off. Among
workers who would be worse off under the new plan, benefits would be
reduced on average between ∞∑ and ≤≠ percent relative to their prior plans.
That analysis also found that tagging those who would be worse off under
the new plan as ‘‘losers’’ did not adequately reflect how they would continue
to benefit under the new plan relative to their counterparts who might be
characterized as ‘‘winners.’’ This point is illustrated in Table ∂, which shows
future pension accruals as a percentage of pay for workers classified as
winners and losers in that case study of an actual employer’s shift to a cash
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balance plan.∞∞ The top panel reflects accrual rates for workers who would
be better off under the cash balance plan than they would be under the
prior plan, while the bottom portion represent those who would be worse
off. It is interesting to note that for every age and service category, the
‘‘losers’’ accrued pension value at a higher rate than did the ‘‘winners.’’ So
some participants were made worse off by the transition, but they will gain
more from delayed retirement. In other words the shift resulted in a more
equitable allocation of pension accruals and benefits across workers who
leave prior to retirement eligibility and those who stay longer. For the most
part, these younger workers who end up being losers in the pension shift are
the ones who work under the new hybrid plan until they reach the age of
early retirement eligibility under the prior traditional pension plan. For
these workers, it is the elimination of early retirement subsidies that ac-
counts for much of the benefit reduction in the shift to hybrid plans.
Cutting Benefits Through Curtailment of Early
Retirement Subsidies
Are companies changing their plans as a means of reducing retirement
benefits to save employment costs, or are they instead implementing a new
human resource model that retains older workers in the twenty-first cen-
tury? Understanding what is motivating the shift to hybrid plans depends in
part on whether the plan conversion lowers annual pension benefits and
how much of any benefit changes is attributable to the elimination of early
retirement subsidies. Therefore we next analyze the overall benefit changes
that workers eligible for early retirement subsidies incur in the move to
hybrid plans. These changes in benefits are divided into two components:
the first is the extent to which the elimination of the early retirement sub-
sidy by itself affects benefits, and the second is the extent to which benefits
are adjusted beyond the elimination of the early retirement subsidy.∞≤
Suppose that in a traditional pension plan, the worker could expect to
accumulate a benefit at age ∑∫ that had a value of three times his pay, at
point A in Figure ∂. Suppose further that the early retirement subsidy made
up one third of the value of that accumulated benefit at that age. If the
employer simply eliminated the early retirement subsidy, the benefit at age
∑∑ would only be worth twice the worker’s pay, point B in Figure ∂. Instead,
however, this employer might adopt a new hybrid plan that eliminated the
early retirement subsidy in the traditional plan, and also adopted further
benefit modifications such that this worker’s accrued benefit at age ∑∫ is
only one and a half times his pay (point C ). In this case, the worker would
incur a ≥≥.≥ percent benefit reduction in moving from the traditional to the
hybrid plan, due to the elimination of the early retirement subsidy. She
would incur an additional ∞∏.π percent reduction from further modifica-
tions to the prior accrual pattern of the pension. Stated alternatively, two-
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Figure ∂. Relative role of the elimination of early retirement subsidies in the total
reduction in benefits in the shift to a hybrid pension, scenario ∞. Source: Authors’
calculations.
thirds of the total benefit reduction in this case would be attributable to
the elimination of early retirement subsidies in the transition from the tra-
ditional to the hybrid plan. The extent to which benefits were reduced
by more than simply the elimination of early retirement subsidies is sum-
marized in Table ∑. The three panels summarize the results for the same
prototypical workers as appeared in Table ≥. Row labels show the percent-
age benefit reduction due to the shift from traditional to hybrid plan at-
tributable to the elimination of the early retirement subsidy. For example,
the top panel in the first column focuses on a worker who retires at age ∑∑
with ≤∑ years of service: in ≤.∏ percent of all the plans, the elimination of the
early retirement subsidy represented between ≠.≠ and ≤∂.Ω percent of the
total reduction in benefits for such a worker. For the ≥≠-year-old new-hire at
the point of transition to the new plan, only ∞∑.∏ percent of all hybrid plans
would provide a benefit at age ∑∑ that reduced benefits by more than simply
eliminating the early retirement subsidies in the prior plan. In eight of nine
cases in Table ∑, fewer than half of the new plans cut benefits by more than if
plan sponsors had simply eliminated early retirement subsidies, but left the
remainder of the benefit formula intact. Even when benefits were cut by
more than the early retirement subsidy, the subsidy elimination accounted
for most of the benefit reduction.
Some employers did reduce benefits for many early retirees in the shift
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Table 5. Benefit Reductions Attributable to the Elimination of Early Retirement
Subsidies in the Shift to Hybrid Plans: Cases Where Benefits Were Re-
duced by More Than the Value of the Subsidy
Total Benefit Reduction from
Elimination of Early Retirement
Subsidy (%)
Percent of plans at age
∑∑ ∏≠ ∏≤
New hire at age ≥≠, beginning salary of $∂≠,≠≠≠
≠.≠–≤∂.Ω ≤.∏ π.∫ ∞≥.≠
≤∑.≠–∂Ω.Ω ∞.≥ π.∫ ∞≠.∂
∑≠.≠–π∂.Ω π.∫ ∞∞.π ∞∑.∏
π∑.≠–ΩΩ.Ω ≥.Ω ∞∂.≥ Ω.∞
Plans where benefit cut exceeds
early retirement subsidies (%)
∞∑.∏ ∂∞.∏ ∂∫.∞
Worker at age ∂≠ with ∞≠ years of service, earning $∑≠,≠≠≠ at transition to new plan
≠.≠–≤∂.Ω ≤.∏ π.∫ ∞≥.≠
≤∑.≠–∂Ω.Ω ≥.Ω Ω.∞ ∞∞.π
∑≠.≠–π∂.Ω ≥.Ω ∞≥.≠ ∞∏.Ω
π∑.≠–ΩΩ.Ω ∏.∑ ∞≥.≠ Ω.∞
Plans where benefit cut exceeds
early retirement subsidies (%)
∞∏.Ω ∂≤.Ω ∑≠.π
Worker at age ∑≠ with ≤≠ years of service, earning $∏≠,≠≠≠ at transition to new plan
≠.≠–≤∂.Ω ≤.∏ Ω.∞ ∞∞.π
≤∑.≠–∂Ω.Ω ≥.Ω ∏.∑ ∞≠.∂
∑≠.≠–π∂.Ω ≤.∏ ∞∞.π ∞∂.≥
π∑.≠–ΩΩ.Ω ∞≥.≠ Ω.∞ Ω.∞
Plans where benefit cut exceeds
early retirement subsidies (%)
≤≤.∞ ≥∏.∂ ∂∑.∑
Source: Authors’ calculations; see text.
from a traditional plan to the hybrid, but by less than the reduction that
would have been imposed by only eliminating the early retirement subsidies
in the original plan. Scenario ≤ is depicted in Figure ∑, where we focus on a
worker at age ∑π. Under the traditional plan, this worker would have earned
a benefit worth three and a half years of pay, point A in Figure ∑. If the plan
sponsor had simply eliminated the early retirement subsidy in the plan, the
accrued benefit would be worth only two years of pay, point B in the figure.
But under the new hybrid plan, the benefit was actually worth two and a half
years of pay, point C. In this case, the value of the early retirement subsidy
was one and a half year’s pay but the reduction in benefits in the shift to the
new plans was only one year’s pay. In other words, the elimination of the
early retirement subsidy in this case represented ∞∑≠ percent of the total
reduction realized in the shift to the new plan.
The prevalence of this scenario where total benefits were reduced but by
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Figure ∑. Relative role of the elimination/ of early retirement subsidies in the total
reduction in benefits in the shift to a hybrid pension, scenario ≤. Source: Authors’
calculations from data provided by Watson Wyatt Worldwide.
less than the elimination of early retirement subsidies is summarized in
Table ∏. Our sample plan sponsors put some of the reduction in benefits
realized from eliminating early retirement subsidies in their prior plans
back into the new hybrid plan. Thus between ≤≠ and ∂∂ percent of the plans
fell into this category, depending on age and service of workers at various
early retirement ages. Workers retiring at younger ages appear to be more
likely to fall into this category, where some portion of the early retirement
subsidy was put back into the new benefit, than those retiring at older ages.
In the cases where elimination of the early retirement subsidy was a very
large percentage of the total benefit reduction, it is an indication that most
of the early subsidy reduction was put back into the plan. For example, when
the early retirement subsidy elimination represents ∂≠≠ percent of the total
benefit reduction in the shift to the hybrid plan, it implies that more than
three-fourths of the subsidy in the old plan was reinstated in the new plan
benefit. The workers represented in Table ∏ all would end up getting a
smaller benefit under their new plan than under the prior one, but many of
the benefit reductions are relatively small, especially in comparison to the
early retirement subsidies in the original plans.
In a third scenario, employers eliminated the early retirement incentives
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Table 6. Benefit Reductions Attributable to the Elimination of Early Retirement
Subsidies in the Shift to Hybrid Plans: Cases Where Total Benefits Were
Reduced by Less Than the Value of the Subsidy
Total benefit reduction realized from
elimination of the early retirement
subsidy (%)
Percent of Plans at Age
∑∑ ∏≠ ∏≤
New hire at age ≥≠, beginning salary of $∂≠,≠≠≠
∞≠≠.≠–∞≤∂.Ω π.∫ π.∫ π.∫
∞≤∑.≠–∞∂Ω.Ω ∏.∑ ≤.∏ ∞.≥
∞∑≠.≠–∞ΩΩ.Ω ∏.∑ ∏.∑ ≤.∏
≤≠≠.≠–≥ΩΩ.Ω ∞∞.π ∑.≤ ∏.∑
∂≠≠.≠+ ∞≠.∂ ≤.∏ ∞.≥
∂≤.Ω ≤∂.π ∞Ω.∑
Worker at age ∂≠ with ∞≠ years of service, earning $∑≠,≠≠≠ at transition to new plan
∞≠≠.≠–∞≤∂.Ω π.∫ Ω.∞ π.∫
∞≤∑.≠–∞∂Ω.Ω π.∫ ∏.∑ ≤.∏
∞∑≠.≠–∞ΩΩ.Ω Ω.∞ ≥.Ω ≥.Ω
≤≠≠.≠–≥ΩΩ.Ω Ω.∞ ≥.Ω ≥.Ω
∂≠≠.≠+ ∞≠.∂ ≥.Ω ≤.∏
∂∂.≤ ≤π.≥ ≤≠.∫
Worker at age ∑≠ with ≤≠ years of service, earning $∏≠,≠≠≠ at transition to new plan
∞≠≠.≠–∞≤∂.Ω ∑.≤ ∑.≤ ≥.Ω
∞≤∑.≠–∞∂Ω.Ω ≤.∏ ∏.∑ ≠.≠
∞∑≠.≠–∞ΩΩ.Ω ∏.∑ ≠.≠ ∑.≤
≤≠≠.≠–≥ΩΩ.Ω ∑.≤ Ω.∞ ∑.≤
∂≠≠.≠+ ∏.∑ ∑.≤ ∑.≤
≤∏.≠ ≤∏.≠ ∞Ω.∑
Source: Authors’ calculations; see text.
that had been embedded in their prior plans as they set up the replacement
hybrid plans, but in the aggregate they ended up increasing benefits. This
scenario is reflected in Figure ∏. In this case we will focus on a worker at age
∏∞. Under the traditional plan, this worker would have earned a benefit
worth two times pay as reflected in the figure. If the sponsor in this case
had simply eliminated the early retirement subsidy in the prior plan, the
worker’s benefit would have dropped to the equivalent of one and a half
year’s pay as reflected by point B in the figure. But under the new hybrid
plan, the benefit was actually worth two and a half year’s of pay as reflected
by point C. Despite losing his early retirement subsidy at age ∑∑, this worker
would actually be better off under the new plan than under the prior one. In
shifting to the new plan in this case, the sponsor put back into the plan the
full value of the early retirement subsidy that was eliminated in the shift to
the new plan plus even more for the hypothetical worker.
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Figure ∏. Relative role of the elimination of early retirement subsidies in the total
reduction in benefits in the shift to a hybrid pension, scenario ≥. Source: Authors’
calculations from data provided by Watson Wyatt Worldwide.
The prevalence of this scenario appears in Table π.∞≥ In most of the cases,
the majority of the new hybrid plans would end up reducing benefits for the
prototypical workers by less than the amount of the reduction that would
occur if employers had simply eliminated their early retirement subsidies.
For cases where the worker is assumed to retire at age ∑∑, fewer than one-
quarter of the plans would reduce benefits by more than the elimination of
the early retirement subsidies. For these workers ∂≠ to ∑≠ percent of the
plans would actually enhance benefits relative to the old plan, even though
they had eliminated the subsidies related to early retirement. The only case
in the table where most plans would end up reducing benefits by more than
the value of the early retirement subsidy is when the worker was hired at ≥≠,
was converted to a hybrid plan at ∂≠, and worked until age ∏≤. In that case,
just over half of the plans would pay a benefit reduced by more than the
amount of the early retirement subsidy.
The Role of Pensions and National Retirement Policy
Retirement became an important segment of the lives of most Americans in
the ≤≠th century, attributable to rising real incomes and shifts in the struc-
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Table 7. Shares of Benefit Reductions Attributable to the Elimination of Early Re-
tirement Subsidies in the Shift from Traditional Pensions to Hybrid Plans
Percent of Plans at Age
∑∑ ∏≠ ∏≤
New hire at age ≥≠ at a beginning salary of $∂≠,≠≠≠
Benefit cut exceeds subsidy ∞∑.∏ ∂∞.∏ ∂∫.∞
Benefit cut less than subsidy ∂≤.Ω ≤∂.π ∞Ω.∑
Benefit not cut or increased ∂∞.∏ ≥≥.∫ ≥≤.∑
Worker at age ∂≠ with ∞≠ years of service earning $∑≠,≠≠≠ at transition to new plan
Benefit cut exceeds subsidy ∞∏.Ω ∂≤.Ω ∑≠.π
Benefit cut less than subsidy ∂∂.≤ ≤π.≥ ≤≠.∫
Benefit not cut or increased ≥Ω.≠ ≤Ω.Ω ≤∫.∏
Worker at age ∑≠ with ≤≠ years of service earning $∏≠,≠≠≠ at transition to new plan
Benefit cut exceeds subsidy ≤≤.∞ ≥∏.∂ ∂∑.∑
Benefit cut less than subsidy ≤∏.≠ ≤∏.≠ ∞Ω.∑
Benefit not cut or increased ∑≤.≠ ≥π.π ≥∑.∞
Source: Authors’ calculations; see text.
ture of the national economy that altered older persons’ employment pros-
pects. Retirement has evolved because of the conscious development of na-
tional retirement policies that have undergone substantial change since the
establishment of social security. Initially, those policies sought to provide
adequate retirement income to a segment of the elderly population facing
low income and difficulty finding employment. In addition, retirement was
sometimes encouraged to create job opportunities for younger workers.
social security was designed to provide retirement income and required
‘‘retirement’’ as a condition of eligibility. Medicare offered national health
care for those aged ∏∑ and older. Preferential tax treatment was granted to
employer pensions that met certain regulatory standards, and for many
years national policy permitted mandatory retirement at age ∏∑.
These policies have come under scrutiny in the last quarter century, with
this reconsideration producing the elimination of mandatory retirement,
the raising of the normal retirement age under social security, and the
elimination of the earnings test for persons older than the normal retire-
ment age. From a societal perspective, we have switched from subsidizing
early retirement to encouraging delayed retirement, partly due to a chang-
ing perception about what is ‘‘fair.’’ For instance, mandatory retirement
provisions were eliminated because policymakers decided it was unfair to
force productive people out of their jobs simply because of age. Social se-
curity’s retirement age was raised because policymakers decided the cost
of sustaining the original age would be unfair to workers in the face of grow-
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ing dependency levels significantly driven by increases in life expectancy
of retirees.
Retirement policies have also changed because of the changing dynamics
of the labor market. Social security’s earnings test was criticized because it
discouraged people eligible for benefits from working. In the ∞Ω≥≠s, when
unemployment was rampant and policymakers thought that an older work-
er’s retirement would create a job opening for a young worker, this policy
appeared to make sense. In today’s economy, where labor force growth rates
are the lowest they have been in a half century and where they are expected
to fall even lower in the coming decades, such policies are less persuasive.
Employers today operate in exactly the same environment as that dictat-
ing changes to social security policies. In an era of unprecedented tight
labor markets, bribing workers to retire more than a decade before they will
be eligible for full social security benefits is probably undesirable for many
employers. This is a partial explanation for the strong and continued trend
toward greater use of defined contribution pensions over time, plans that
rarely have subsidized early retirement options. This transition is the result
of various regulatory and economic factors, including the higher cost of
complying with federal regulation, especially for small firms, along with
changes in worker and firm preferences concerning deferred compensa-
tion. As a result, many employers terminated their defined benefit plans
and established defined contribution plans, while emerging companies
were much more likely to select defined contribution plans. Many large
companies that have retained their defined benefit plans have also been
concerned about the economic incentives in these plans. Key points include
the attraction to young workers who have a relatively low probability of
remaining with the company until retirement and the inability to retain
older workers due to the significant early retirement incentives imbedded in
their traditional plans. A growing number of these companies have con-
verted their traditional plans to a type of hybrid plan that provides an
individual account balance that appeals to younger workers, and also elimi-
nates the early retirement incentives discouraging continued employment
of workers still in their productive prime.∞∂
Conclusions and Discussion
Interestingly, the almost three decade long shift to defined contribution
plans has received relatively little adverse publicity, while the more recent
shift to hybrid plans has been the target of considerable hostile reaction by
Congress, the press, and labor organizations. It is ironic that the effects of
the two types of plan changes are actually quite similar. In both cases, early
retirement incentives are eliminated, individual accounts are established,
younger short-tenured workers almost always gain, and older more senior
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workers who anticipated the early retirement subsidy lose retirement in-
come relative to what they had expected.
Is the move to hybrid pension plans desirable? The answer to this ques-
tion is in the eye of the beholder. Individuals who expect to remain with a
single employer throughout their career and retire from this company typ-
ically will prefer a traditional defined benefit plan. In contrast, workers who
anticipate that they will change employers several times will prefer retire-
ment plans that include portable individual accounts such as defined contri-
bution plans and cash balance plans. Workers who want to manage their
own retirement funds and are willing to bear the investment risk associated
with financial decisions will prefer defined contribution plans, while those
seeking to avoid this type of risk will want to be covered by a defined benefit
or cash balance plan.
The primary advantages of cash balance plans for employees are universal
coverage, portability of benefits, and little investment risk. These plans allow
employers to appeal to mobile workers and offer guaranteed benefits that
do not include subsidized early retirement. Employers who wish to continue
to use their pension plans to encourage lower turnover or to provide strong
retirement incentives at particular ages will maintain traditional defined
benefit plans. Companies seeking to attract younger, more mobile workers
along with those seeking to discourage early retirement will tend to offer
defined contribution and cash balance plans.
We believe that the shift to hybrid plans is consistent with a number of
other elements of national retirement policy described above, and in par-
ticular it will bring employer pensions in greater alignment with evolving
social security policy. Proponents of social security have often suggested its
superiority to employer pensions because of its greater portability. Hybrid
plans provide significantly more portability than traditional defined benefit
plans. Critics of hybrid plans suggest that such plans are unfair because they
do not provide the accelerated growth in benefits late in workers’ careers
that traditional defined benefit plans provided. However, hybrid plans pro-
vide more level accruals over workers’ whole careers and provide much
higher accruals late in workers’ careers than does social security. As policy-
makers struggle to encourage workers to extend their careers to make en-
titlement programs more sustainable, it would be expected that they would
be simultaneously interested in encouraging employers to adopt pension
plans that supportive of that policy goal.
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∞. The PBGC (∞ΩΩΩ) reports that the proportion of the labor force covered by a
defined benefit plan declined from ≥∫ percent in ∞Ω∫≠ to ≤≥ percent in ∞ΩΩ∑. As a
result, the proportion of pension participants with primary coverage in a defined
benefit plan declined from ∫≥ percent to ∑≠ percent. The number of defined benefit
plans with fewer than ∞,≠≠≠ workers dropped from Ω≤,≠≠≠ in ∞Ω∫≠ to ≥∫,≠≠≠ in ∞ΩΩ∫,
while there was a slight increase in the number of plans with over ∞,≠≠≠ employees.
The number of active participants in defined benefit plans of all sizes less than
∞≠,≠≠≠ participants declined sharply during this period.
≤. While the plans studied here are all sponsored by Watson Wyatt clients, Watson
Wyatt consultants were not involved in the design of the new plans in all cases. The
choice of particular consulting firms by companies seeking to develop hybrid plans
may have some influence on the plan characteristics ultimately adopted by the plan
sponsor. This conjecture is based on the observation that the benefit consulting
firms have different positions concerning the philosophy of retirement plan design
that may motivate clients with different plan goals to select one consulting firm over
another when they are redesigning their pension plans.
≥. This conclusion is based on a comparison with roughly ≥∑≠ defined benefit
pension plans in the Watson Wyatt Comparison database for ∞ΩΩΩ.
∂. By law, wage increases for those who continue to work after the normal retire-
ment age must be reflected in higher future benefits. However, companies are al-
lowed to cap years of service and they are not required to provide actuarial adjust-
ments associated with declining life expectancy at older ages (see McGill et al. ∞ΩΩ∏).
∑. Throughout this example, earnings are assumed to grow at ∂.≠ percent per year.
The discount and benefit conversion rates used throughout are π.≠ percent per year.
We used the GAM∫≥ mortality rates for males with a ≥-year setback.
∏. This methodology is outlined in paragraph ∂≠, FASB (∞Ω∫∑).
π. As a result our estimates will not precisely replicate actual plan costs or change
in costs that these plan sponsors would have incurred and reported on their financial
statements, if they had eliminated early retirement subsidies while retaining all other
aspects of their prior plans.
∫. If these assumptions understate turnover patterns, our estimate of the pro-
jected unit credit cost for the traditional pension may be too high, since traditional
plan costs fall with high turnover. However, if we understate turnover, estimated cost
of hybrid plans might also be too high. In this case the issue is primarily related to the
portion of workers that can be expected to vest in the new plan. In the traditional
plan, the benefits earned in the early part of the career tend to be so negligible, that
understating vesting rates for new hires will have little effect on plan costs. In the
hybrid plan, on the other hand, benefits at the date of vesting are typically substan-
tial. Understating vesting in this case could have a significant effect on the cost
estimate. We do not have access the actual turnover experience for the individual
plans being studied, but we have no reason to believe that our methodology biases
the analysis or results.
Ω. This would occur because of the variations in benefit formulas across pay levels
in the plans both before and after the transition to the hybrid plans.
∞≠. In assessing the implications of the shift to hybrid plans we were faced with a
choice of moving the transition date across time so all plans were treated as having
changed at the same time, or taking them at their current state of evolution from the
prior to current system. For purposes of this analysis, we use the plan’s actual transi-
tion date.
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∞∞. To derive this, the authors calculated the present value of benefits that would be
paid at termination for each worker whose career we were simulating and compared it
to the present value of their accrued benefit at the point the employer shifted to the
cash balance plan. The difference between the two is the additional amount that each
worker would earn between the point of transition and their actual departure from
the company. The authors divided this difference by the present value of future
earnings while still with the employer. The result is what actuaries refer to as the
aggregate normal cost, reflecting the accrual of future benefits as a constant percent-
age of pay over the remainder of workers’ careers with the employer.
∞≤. In the second case, there are three possibilities. The first is that benefits are cut
further than the elimination of the early retirement subsidy. The second is that some
portion of the reduction in benefits from eliminating early retirement subsidies is
put back into the new benefit formula effecting workers reaching early retirement
ages but it is not enough to completely offset the elimination of the subsidy. The
third is that benefits are sufficiently enhanced in the new formula that the reduction
in early retirement subsidies is completely offset. In this last case, workers reaching
early retirement ages will end up getting larger benefits under the new planes even
though the incentives encouraging early retirement have been eliminated in the
process. We estimate the extent to which all three cases arise.
∞≥. These results are shown in the third row of each panel in the table. The first
two rows in each panel are the subtotal results from the prior two tables summarizing
the prior two scenarios. In one of the prototypical examples shown there, the major-
ity of new plans would fall into this scenario. In most of the cases, roughly one-third
of the plans would fall into this category.
∞∂. Another interesting parallel between changes in national retirement policy
and pension plan conversions involves the transitional effects on current workers
associated with significant changes in plan type or in plan benefit formulas. Conver-
sions of pensions from defined benefit to cash balance or defined contribution plans
tend to have an adverse effect on older workers nearing retirement. As we have
discussed, companies can moderate this impact through the use of special transition
benefits for these workers. Congress faced the same problem in ∞Ωππ when the
benefit formula for social security benefits was altered. The change in the social
security benefit formula meant that workers faced substantially lower annual bene-
fits under the new rules. In this case, individuals born prior to ∞Ω∞π were allowed
to remain under the old benefit formula, persons born from ∞Ω∞π to ∞Ω≤∞ faced
a declining benefit formula, and everyone born after ∞Ω≤∞ would receive retire-
ment benefits under the new formula. This change meant that similar workers were
treated differently based on their birth year. The transition policy adopted by Con-
gress is similar to that used by many employers in pension conversions and it also
produced considerable reaction from the so-called ‘‘notch babies.’’ One can only
imagine the reaction if the Social Security Administration had been sending out
benefits statements in ∞Ωππ as it is now required to do.
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